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1
I. ENERGY TAXATION AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY
Over the past three years, policy towards the taxation of energy has been debated
vigorously. In 1991 the European Commission proposed a new carbon/energy
tax as part of a package of measures intended to reduce energy use and to help
the Community meet international targets for reducing emissions of carbon
dioxide and other ‘greenhouse gases’. This would have applied to both domestic
and industrial users of energy and motor fuels. Also, in the area of UK domestic
policy, the Chancellor’s 1993 Budget announced the phased extension of the
standard rate of value added tax to domestic energy, which had hitherto been
zero-rated in the UK. The extension of standard-rate VAT to domestic energy
was primarily motivated by the need for increased tax revenues, but, at the same
time, the Government maintained that the measure would have the valuable by-
product of reducing energy consumption, and hence contributing to achievement
of targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
One common issue raised by both the proposed EC carbon/energy tax and the
extension of VAT to domestic fuel is the likely distributional impact. Domestic
energy forms a much larger part of the budgets of poorer households than of
those of the population as a whole; Crawford, Smith and Webb (1993) show that
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domestic energy accounts for some 17 per cent of the non-durable spending of
the bottom decile, but only 10 per cent of household spending on average.
Additional taxes on domestic energy will thus tend to have a regressive
distributional incidence,
2 in the sense that the extra energy tax payments will be
a higher percentage of income (or of total spending) for poorer households than
for the better-off.
3
In addition to the burden of extra taxation, a second issue has been the
distribution of the burden of reductions in energy consumption in response to
higher energy prices. It appears likely that the reduction in energy consumption
induced by the imposition of VAT on domestic energy will be appreciably
greater amongst poorer households; Crawford, Smith and Webb (1993) estimate
that the energy spending of the bottom quintile would fall by 9 per cent in
volume terms, whilst the average reduction in the volume of energy consumption
would be of the order of 6 per cent.
The aggregate economic cost of adjustment to higher energy prices will be
higher where energy consumers are prevented by market failures from making
optimal adjustments in energy use. An efficient pattern of adjustment to higher
energy prices might include both reductions in energy consumption and greater
levels of investment in various measures to increase the efficiency with which
energy is used. In the domestic sector, measures that households can take to
improve domestic energy efficiency may include such things as loft insulation,
double glazing and wall insulation. It has been suggested that markets for these
investments may be subject to various forms of market failure, possibly
including credit market failures, informational failures and certain market
failures related to housing tenure. Where households are prevented by market
failures from adjusting efficiently to higher energy prices, their reductions in
energy consumption in response to higher energy prices will tend to be smaller,
and more ‘painful’ in terms of their welfare cost.
The social and distributional costs of higher energy prices may be
exacerbated if market failures in energy efficiency investment are particularly
concentrated amongst low-income households or other vulnerable groups (Smith,
1992). Thus, for example, income-related market failures, such as those related
to the credit market or to housing tenure, may tend to amplify the distributional
cost of reducing energy consumption through pricing instruments. Measures to
rectify the underlying market failures would then have the twin merits that they
would tend to reduce the aggregate economic cost of achieving a given reduction
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in consumption, and at the same time would also help to reduce the social and
distributional cost of higher energy taxation.
Policies to promote greater energy efficiency have been pursued by many
governments in the OECD area since the oil shocks of the 1970s, initially for
balance-of-payments reasons. A range of policy interventions have been used,
including financial incentives through taxes and subsidies, policies to improve
the information available to private decision-makers, and building regulations
(Brechling, Helm and Smith, 1991). More recently, attention has shifted to the
potential contribution of these policy measures to environmental policy
objectives, both directly, through the reductions in energy consumption that
might follow an increase in energy efficiency, and indirectly, by reducing the
cost of adjustments to higher energy prices as outlined above. It has been
suggested that some energy efficiency policies may constitute ‘no regrets’
measures: by correcting market failures that inhibit energy efficiency investment
by individual households, they may improve the functioning of the economy,
regardless of whether reduced energy use confers any future environmental
benefits.
The belief that market failures must be important has been reinforced by
studies, based on technical data, which show substantial rates of return to
investments in domestic energy efficiency in typical properties. For example,
Pezzey (1984) estimated that the net present value per unit of capital cost of loft
insulation was of the order of 3.5–7.5, and of cavity wall insulation between 1.8
and 4.7. Installing double glazing, by contrast, appeared to be unjustified on
grounds of energy saving.
4 Although the proportion of the UK housing stock
with each measure has been rising over time (Figure 1), it is suggested that the
fact that so many households still have not taken these measures may reflect
various market failures.
Nevertheless, despite the role that such arguments have played in the
formulation of policy, evidence about the practical importance of market failures
in domestic energy efficiency is lacking. This paper provides evidence on the
pattern of energy efficiency investments amongst private households in the UK,
based on economic modelling. The results provide some pointers to the relative
significance of some forms of market failures in energy efficiency investments.
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses
various forms of market failure which could arise in the energy efficiency sector.
Section III reports an empirical study of factors affecting household take-up of
energy efficiency measures. Section IV draws some brief conclusions about the
policy implications of the results.
                                                                                                                                   
4 The calculated returns to energy-saving investments will depend on the assumptions made about future energy
prices; as a result of the fall in real energy prices during the past decade, the returns to energy efficiency
measures are likely to be now somewhat lower than during the early 1980s.Household Energy Efficiency
47
FIGURE 1
Percentages of Housing Stock in England with Energy Efficiency Measures
Note: The figures are calculated as the percentage of the housing stock in which it would be possible to install
the energy efficiency measure concerned.
Source: Henderson and Shorrock, 1989.
II. DOMESTIC ENERGY EFFICIENCY DECISIONS
The main focus of the paper is on the actions households can take to prevent
energy loss from energy-using activities, principally domestic space and water
heating, through various energy efficiency investments, including loft insulation,
wall insulation and double glazing. In each case, the energy efficiency measures
have the character of investments; money spent on them in one year yields
benefits over a number of subsequent years.
The demand both for energy and for energy efficiency investments is a
derived demand (Hausman, 1979); consumers seek energy services, in the forms
of heat, light or power, from a combination of energy inputs (electricity, gas etc.)
and capital investments. The choice of how to meet any given demand for energy
services will reflect the costs of energy inputs and insulation, and the efficiency
with which they are transformed into energy services. In some cases (open fires,
and double glazing, perhaps) consumers may derive utility from how the chosen

















































0 1989 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987Fiscal Studies
48
reflect the relative costs of energy and insulation inputs in supplying the chosen
level of energy services.
Market failures arising from a number of sources could, however, prevent
households from choosing an optimal mix of energy consumption and
investments in energy efficiency (Jochem and Gruber, 1990; Brechling, Helm
and Smith, 1991):
•   Information
Some consumers may fail to undertake cost-effective measures because they
are poorly informed about the technological possibilities for energy
efficiency investments and about the likely impact of such investments on
their fuel use and costs.
•   Benefits cannot be appropriated
Cost-effective investments may not be undertaken if the investor cannot
appropriate the subsequent energy savings. Owner-occupiers who expect to
move at some time in the future may not be able to recoup the full value of
investment in energy efficiency through a higher sale price.
5 Also, there may
be problems in tenanted housing, where the landlord may be responsible for
making any structural improvements that would reduce energy use, but
where tenants pay the energy bills. Although, in principle, a higher level of
rents could be charged to reflect the benefits of greater energy efficiency,
this may be prevented by rent control legislation or if tenants are unable to
observe accurately the energy efficiency of the dwelling.
•   Credit market failure
Poorer households tend to be less energy efficient (Boardman, 1991).
However, it is not clear whether poverty as such, or other characteristics of
the household (such as low energy use or tenure), should be seen as the
underlying reason for this. One possible source of low rates of energy
efficiency investments amongst poorer households could be credit market
failures. Poorer households, and other groups of the population with limited
collateral, may be severely restricted in their access to credit at the market
rate of interest (see, for example, Weber (1990)).
•   Uncertainty
Uncertainty may be a source of market failure in household investment
decisions, where households are unable adequately to insure against future
risks. In the present context, such risks could arise from uncertainty about
the effectiveness of particular measures, about the household’s future
circumstances and energy needs, or about the future energy price.
In addition to the above, household decisions about energy efficiency may be
influenced by a wide range of subjective considerations and other non-pecuniary
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costs. The choices made by individual households are unlikely to be determined
simply by the results of an optimising calculation of the installation costs and
potential benefits from energy efficiency investments. Consumers may rely on
inappropriate decision rules, and may make mistakes. There is also survey
evidence that attitudes and other subjective factors significantly affect the
diffusion of energy efficiency measures (Hedges, 1991).
III. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This section summarises an analysis of the pattern of household take-up of
energy efficiency measures; more detail of the analysis is given in Brechling and
Smith (1992). This study used data from the 1986 English House Condition
Survey (EHCS) to model the pattern of take-up of three key energy efficiency
measures — loft insulation, wall insulation and double glazing — by a sample of
nearly 7,000 households in England.
6 This data set was particularly suited to
examining the interaction between energy efficiency decisions and the socio-
economic factors likely to reflect market failures, in that it included data on
specific physical features of the dwelling, socio-economic data about the current
occupants, and, for a sub- sample of the data, fuel consumption information from
both gas and electricity board records.
Table 1 reports logit reduced-form models which explain household
possession of each of the three energy efficiency measures — loft insulation,
cavity wall insulation and double glazing — as a function of the features of the
property and of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of its
current occupants. Each model excludes households that are unable to install the
measure concerned; thus, in modelling loft insulation, households without lofts
have been omitted. ‘Don’t Know’ replies have also been excluded.
To give an indication of the strength of the effects of the various variables in
the estimated models, we show in Table 2 how predicted probabilities of
possession, based on the estimated models, vary with changes in household
characteristics (income, tenure etc.).
1. Loft Insulation
The first pair of columns in Table 1 report the reduced form for loft insulation.
Fourteen of the explanatory variables are found to be significant at the 5 per cent
level.
Many of the significant variables describe the physical characteristics of the
dwelling. The most obvious interpretation of these variables is that they reflect
differences in the cost of undertaking a particular measure. In general, the signs
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of the physical variables are consistent with this interpretation. Dwelling size,
for example, tends to be negatively related to the probability of ownership of
both loft and wall insulation.Household Energy Efficiency
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In comparison, most of the socio-economic variables are not significant. This
is perhaps not surprising in the case of the ‘short-term’ variables, such as
unemployment, since the investment decisions being modelled will usually have
occurred some time prior to the survey, and socio-economic variables will only
be likely to figure in the results if they show some stability over time. Significant
effects are, however, found from two socio-economic variables — tenure and
income. Properties occupied by private tenants are found to have lower levels of
loft insulation than the base (owner-occupied properties); the difference is
statistically significant and sizeable. A statistically significant effect of income is
also found, but as Table 2 shows, its quantitative effect on the probability of
having loft insulation is very small.
Interpreting the coefficients on these two variables in the reduced-form
equations estimated here is difficult; they could reflect either some direct
influence of income or tenure on the energy efficiency decision, or an indirect
influence, through effects of tenure or income on household demand for energy
services, which in turn would affect the returns to energy efficiency investments.
The reduced-form models shown here cannot separately identify these two typesFiscal Studies
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of effect.
7 To the extent that the significant coefficients on income and tenure
reflect the former channel of influence, however, this would tend to indicate the
presence of market failures in household energy efficiency investments. Since
loft insulation and some other energy efficiency investments are likely to be
desired only as a means to achieving a given standard of energy services, and not
desired in themselves, we would not expect to find any strong direct effect of
socio-economic characteristics on household energy efficiency decisions in an
efficiently- functioning market. A direct relationship between energy efficiency
decisions and socio-economic characteristics might, however, be encountered
where certain types of households (such as low-income households) faced
significant market failures.
Large effects are found from the type of heating: loft insulation is more likely
amongst households with central heating, and is less likely where households use
electricity for heating than where they use gas (the base case). The role of central
heating in the loft insulation model may be interpreted in various ways. One
interpretation, which reflects the higher rates of return to energy efficiency
investments in well-heated houses (Pezzey, 1984), is that the central-heating
variable proxies the standard of heating of different houses, and the positive sign
on the central-heating variable thus reflects a tendency for households to be
more likely to undertake energy efficiency measures where the gains are greater.
On the other hand, a relationship between energy efficiency investment and the
possession of central heating could also reflect differences in awareness and
attitudes to investments; households that have invested in central heating may be
better informed than the average or may be the type of households that invest in
home improvements more generally.
2. Wall Insulation
Given the large energy savings from wall insulation, the very small percentage of
households that actually possess wall insulation (11 per cent in 1986) is perhaps
surprising. Also, the variables available appear to explain less of the pattern of
ownership of wall insulation than of the other measures, as shown by the
‘pseudo’ R
2s.
As with loft insulation, physical factors play a more important role than
socio- economic influences. There is rather more variation by type of house and
by region than with loft insulation. The type of heating fuel does not contribute
significantly to the explanation of the pattern of wall insulation, although, as in
the loft insulation equation, the possession of central heating has a positive and
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significant impact. The probability of having wall insulation is higher amongst
more recently-built dwellings than amongst older ones.
The strongly significant negative effect of flats and semi-detached and
terraced houses over the base detached house could reflect one of two
influences. The ‘need’ for insulation and the individual energy saving for each
household may be lower in semi-detached or terraced houses or in flats because
they have fewer exposed walls. Alternatively, the lower probability of having
wall insulation could arise from decision-making problems associated with the
shared ownership of walls: organisation and information problems would tend to
increase with the number of households participating in the decision.
An important consideration is that some dwellings may face restricted
choices over wall insulation. There are three ways in which walls may be
insulated — internal solid insulation, external solid insulation and cavity fill
insulation. Of the three, cavity fill is the only type that can be installed without
major reconstruction or redecoration of the inner or outer walls, and it therefore
tends to be the only cost- efficient method of insulating walls except when other
work is needed on the dwelling (Pezzey, 1984). The results in Table 1 report the
probabilities of possessing any type of insulation, and the sample of households
on which estimation is based includes all households, not just those with cavity
walls.
The model is therefore based on a sample which includes households that are
unable to install the main type of wall insulation; this may bias the estimates of
the factors affecting the decisions of those households that do face a genuine
choice regarding wall insulation. We have therefore estimated a second model,
based on a sub-sample of dwellings that we can be reasonably sure will have
cavity walls. Whilst many older houses do not have cavity walls, cavity walls
have been required by legislation throughout the post-war period; selecting a
sample of dwellings built since 1945 will thus select a sample that could install
cavity wall insulation.
The results of this exercise are not reported in detail here,
8 since in practice
most of the estimated coefficients are quite stable between the two models. A
number of the significant coefficients, including the income coefficient, are
somewhat larger in the post-1945 model; otherwise, the main difference is that
the central-heating dummy has a smaller and less significant coefficient in the
post-1945 model. There are slightly fewer significant explanatory variables in
the model estimated on the post-1945 sample (partly because of the reduced
sample size), but the overall level of explanation of the variation in the data, as
measured by the ‘pseudo’ R
2, is slightly higher.
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3. Double Glazing
The double glazing equation has the highest explanatory power of all of the
models in Table 1, with many significant variables. In most cases, the variables
have the same sign as for the other insulation measures, but there is a clear
difference in the impact of electric heating. Electric heating tended to reduce the
probabilities of having loft insulation and wall insulation; in this model,
households are more likely to possess double glazing if they use electricity for
heating. The model also shows significant regional variation, with positive
effects from dummy variables for London and the south-east, perhaps reflecting
the investment into home improvements during the housing boom of the 1980s.
The income coefficient reported in Table 1, while significant, is no greater
than the income coefficient in the estimates for either loft insulation or wall
insulation. This is perhaps surprising, since double glazing may be installed for
various reasons other than energy saving (for example, to reduce noise), and the
demand for these other attributes of double glazing might have been expected to
lead to a greater income elasticity than for the models where decisions reflect the
effect of the measure on energy costs alone.
The model shown in Table 1 estimates the probability of having at least one
window in the dwelling double glazed. We have also estimated a second model,
for double glazing of the entire house. The reason for being interested in this is
that partial double glazing could be undertaken for reasons unconnected with
energy saving (for example, to cut out the noise of a nearby road), whilst full
double glazing is generally an energy efficiency measure. The effects of the
various explanatory variables are broadly similar over the two models. Income is
no longer a significant variable in the model for full glazing; this partly reflects
the reduction in sample size, but would also be consistent with the view that full
glazing was undertaken to obtain benefits from reduced future energy costs,
whilst partial glazing had more direct benefits, for which demand might be
expected to be a positive function of income.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Arguments about market failure play a key role in justifying government
intervention in the market for domestic energy efficiency. Despite this, there has
been little available empirical evidence about the practical importance of market
failures in energy efficiency which could be used to assess the case for policy
measures or to target policy interventions on the most significant sources of
market failure. This paper has sought to provide some indications based on
economic modelling of factors affecting the pattern of possession of energy
efficiency investments amongst UK households.
The paper has described the results of an analysis using cross-sectional data
from the 1986 English House Condition Survey to assess the role of economicHousehold Energy Efficiency
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factors in contributing to the pattern of household take-up of energy efficiency
measures. Reduced-form logit models have been estimated of the factors
influencing the pattern of possession of the three principal energy efficiency
measures — loft insulation, wall insulation and double glazing.
The results appear to be consistent with the view that there are certain areas
in which market failures may deter households from making rational decisions
regarding energy efficiency investments. In particular, there appears to be a
strong tenure effect on the pattern of each of the three measures, with rates of
possession much lower in private rented properties than in owner-occupied
properties. This suggests that policies to reduce market failures in energy
efficiency could usefully pay attention to the role of tenure-related market
failures — especially to those relating to the private rented sector.
The very much lower rates of energy efficiency investment in private rented
properties than elsewhere may reflect the problems arising from the different
interests of landlord and tenant; for example, if the landlord is responsible for
investing in energy efficiency improvements, whilst the tenant is responsible for
energy bills, landlords will only face efficient incentives for making investments
if they can recoup the benefit through subsequent higher rents. Rent control
legislation may impede rent adjustments of this sort; however, more
fundamentally, there may be an asymmetry of information between landlord and
tenant about the value of the measures installed which would prevent energy
efficiency investments being fully reflected in rent levels, even in a completely
free market. It may be possible to devise schemes (along the lines of the ‘home
energy rating’ schemes currently mainly directed at owner-occupiers) that would
improve the quality of information available to private tenants about the likely
energy costs of a property. Realistically, however, better provision of
information is only likely to go part of the way towards eliminating the problems
in the private rented sector, and other measures, including both subsidy and
regulatory mandation, may be needed if energy efficiency levels in the private
rented sector are to be brought closer to the levels in the rest of the housing
stock.
In comparison with the strong role played by housing tenure in domestic
energy efficiency decisions, there appears to be less indication of any major
income-related market failure. This probably suggests that credit constraints
amongst poorer households are unlikely to have been a major factor inhibiting
energy efficiency investments, and that policies directed at credit market failures
in the area of domestic energy efficiency should therefore be a low priority for
policy. However, this strong conclusion is subject to two significant
qualifications. First, as observed above, the income and other household
characteristics relevant at the time of the insulation decision may differ from the
income of the household observed at the time of the survey. Second, the
observed pattern of possession of energy efficiency measures will reflect the
influence of past policies and incentives in various ways. To the extent that theseFiscal Studies
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policies have been targeted on low-income households, either by grants and
financial incentives or through direct provision and intervention in certain parts
of the housing stock predominantly occupied by lower- income households, they
may have succeeded in eliminating income-related differences in the pattern of
possession of energy efficiency measures that would otherwise have existed.
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